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Abstract
In this paper, we reexamine the question “Why doesn’t capital ‡ow from rich to
poor countries?” posed, most recently, by Lucas (1990). We build a simple contracting
framework where costly intermediation together with an adverse selection problem have
quantitatively important e¤ects on capital ‡ows. When intermediation costs are ignored,
the model behaves much like the neoclassical model in terms of capital returns. However,
when intermediation costs are considered, the return for a given amount of capital can
be non-monotonic in costs. Therefore, the combination of capital and cost di¤erences
across countries gives rise to a rich variation of returns, one that suggests a tendency for
capital to ‡ow to middle income countries, as seen in data. Indeed, when we embed the
static return function in a two-country dynamic model, there is capital out‡ow from a
poor country that removes capital controls and becomes open. We …nd that even though
the closed economy dominates in terms of capital employed in production, it is the open
economy that dominates in terms of income, consumption and welfare.
¤Finance and Business Economics, Marshall School of Business, HOH 701, USC, Los Angeles, CA 90089-
1427. e-mail: ayse@marshall.usc.edu, kbkumar@usc.edu. We are grateful to Matthias Doepke, Charles Engel,
Doug Joines, Robert Lucas, Aris Protopapadakis, Jan Zabojnik and participants at various seminars for
helpful comments. Fanghui Song provided excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this paper
circulated under the title, “Capital Flows.”1 Introduction
Capital ‡ows that are observed in the world economy do not seem consistent with the
predictions of a basic neoclassical model. Many less developed countries with low levels
of capital receive very little foreign capital from the rest of the world. The …rst panel of
Figure 1 displays the net private capital ‡ows (which include private debt ‡ows and private
nondebt ‡ows such as foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment), for poor
and middle income countries as obtained from The 2000 World Development Indicators.
Except for 1987, net private capital ‡ows are higher for middle income countries through
out the 80s and the 90s. Private net ‡ows as a percent of GDP that are presented in the
second panel also show that poor countries received much less capital than the middle income
countries during this period. This pattern holds for the 70s, for individual components of
private capital ‡ows, and for gross private capital ‡ows as a per cent of GDP.
Overall, it seems safe to conclude that there is little tendency for capital to ‡ow from
the rich countries to the poorest countries. Similar observations are outlined in Lucas (1990)
who asked why capital does not ‡ow from the rich to poor countries as predicted by the
neoclassical model. Indeed, the data seems to suggest that the ‡ow, if anything, is to middle
income countries. Moreover, there are, and have been in the past, many countries who have
restricted capital ‡ows in and out of their countries. These observations are at odds with the
neoclassical model in which returns to capital are predicted to be higher in poor countries
with low capital stocks.
In this paper we develop a simple disaggregation of the neoclassical production function
based on a model of intermediation of funds between safe and risky projects, when there is
ex ante heterogeneity of project potential. We assume that entrepreneurs can undertake a
project with a tried and tested safe technology or a risky new technology. However, they are
born without any endowment except for human capital and have to fund the entry costs as
well as capital requirements of the risky projects by borrowing them from the intermediary.
We take the view that all countries have access to the same projects, but institutional
di¤erences may lead to allocation of capital to inferior projects and a¤ect the return to
capital. Thus, the return is determined not only by the level of capital employed but also
by the way it is allocated to di¤erent uses.
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Figure 1: Capital Flows
While there might be a number of institutional details one can model, we focus on the
role of …nancial institutions and government regulations across countries in a¤ecting the
allocation of resources. In Figure 2 we present the relationship between “entry regulations”
provided by Djankov, La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (2001), and PPP-adjusted per capita
GDP in 1997 for 84 countries. The data on entry regulations ranks countries with respect
to bureaucratic and legal procedures to incorporate and register a new …rm. It is based
on required procedures that an average small-medium sized company needs to go through
before starting operation legally. Countries seem to di¤er signi…cantly with respect to the
regulations concerning the entry of new businesses.1 There is a strong negative correlation
between the level of per-capital income and the “entry costs” presented in Figure 2.
1There are four indicators that make up the overall rank: number of procedures, average time spent during
each procedure, o¢cial cost of each procedure, and minimum capital required which all show signi…cant
variance. For example, number of days required to obtain all necessary permits and licences varies between 2
and 168 days; monetary cost of these regulations varies between 0 and 3% of per-capita gross national income
and minimum capital requirement varies between 0 and 43% of per-capita gross national income.


























Figure 2: Entry Costs
In Figure 3 we present the relationship between intermediation costs measured as over-
head costs as a percent of total loans, and PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in 1997 for 109
countries.2 A negative relationship between income and cost is discernible. From this evi-
dence we take away the stylized fact that resource costs of intermediation are higher in poorer
countries.3 We use this evidence together with the evidence on “entry regulations” presented
in Figure 2 to argue that in poorer countries …rms that undertake the risky projects face
higher entry costs as well as costs of intermediating funds. In our model, we focus on a single
cost parameter, the cost of intermediation, to capture the e¤ect of the two institutional costs,
captured in Figures 2 and 3, on the allocation of capital to projects.
2The data for intermediation costs are obtained from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999). Wages
form a big part of overhead costs. For most countries there is data from 1990 to 1997. We plot the average
intermedaition cost for the period available on the horizantal axis. These results are similar to the evidence
presented in Erosa (2001) who examines data from the United Nations for 1985.
3The countries for which both intermediation costs and per capita GDP are both low do not …t this
negative pattern. Some of the countries in this range are Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia, Jordan, and Yemen. It is
important to note that the costs as presented here (in the absence of direct evidence on costs), the only type of
cross-country data available, should be viewed as resources actually spent on intermediation in equilibrium. If
high direct costs of intermediation cause very few projects to be undertaken, one could …nd costs or resources
spent to be very low. As we will see, our model is capable of producing such an outcome. In other words, even
though the cost parameters we use in the model stand in for unobserved costs of intermediation, they give
rise to equilibrium expenditures which can then be compared with data summarized in Figure 3 for assessing
the empirical plausibility of the model.
























a corr = -0.44
Figure 3: Overhead Costs
The reduced-form production function of our model looks very similar to the standard ag-
gregate neoclassical production function, but its rates of return are endogenously determined
based on the mix of safe and risky projects undertaken in response to varying intermediation
costs.4 When intermediation costs are ignored, and variations in the dimension of physical
capital alone are considered, the model behaves exactly like the neoclassical model in terms
of capital returns where poor countries dominate all other countries in rates of return to cap-
ital. However, when intermediation costs are considered two e¤ects emerge. For a given level
of capital, when costs increase, there is a substitution of funds from risky to safe projects,
which given the neoclassical technology results in a decrease in the marginal return. At the
same time there is a decrease in the net funds available for intermediation, which tends to
increase the marginal return to capital (an “income e¤ect”). These opposing e¤ects make
the return for a given amount of capital non-monotonic in costs and their relative strengths
depend on the amount of capital. Therefore, the combination of capital and cost di¤erences
across countries gives rise to a rich variation of returns.5
The bulk of the paper involves presenting and discussing returns for various, empirically
relevant, physical and human capital, and intermediation cost combinations for the above
economies taking the capital stock in the 1980s as a starting point. We show that the model
is able to quantitatively generate returns that are consistent with the stylized fact on capital
‡ows, where middle income countries dominate in returns over a large range of intermediation
costs we think are empirically plausible. The model also produces aggregate measures for
intermediation costs to quantity intermediated, bankruptcy costs, and net interest margin
4In · Imrohoro¼ glu and Kumar (2003) we show that this environment endogeneously generates TFP di¤er-
ences across countries.
5Later we show that a simple modi…cation of the neoclassical model that ignores the e¤ect on the mix of
projects requires empirically implausible costs.
4that are plausible.
Later, we embed the static return functions we obtain in a two-country dynamic model
to get implications on the dynamics of capital ‡ows. Even though the returns at the steady
state are the same between this model and the neoclassical model, the transition paths that
are implied by the two are signi…cantly di¤erent. When we embed the static returns in
a two-country dynamic model, we show that unlike the standard model, capital will ‡ow
from the richest country to the middle income country rather than to the poorest country -
consistent with the data - until an integrated steady state is reached. Indeed the tendency
for the poor country is also to invest in the richer country unless they impose controls to
prevent capital out‡ow. The interesting experiment is the one in which the poor country
removes capital controls and becomes “open”, resulting in a capital out‡ow to the richer
country. We compare this transition to that of a closed economy and show that even though
the closed economy dominates in terms of capital employed in production, it is the open
economy that dominates in terms of income and consumption.
It is important to point out that, there may be various arguments including corruption,
sovereign risk, lack of legal institutions etc., that could play a role in explaining why capital
doesn’t ‡ow to poor countries. However, what we are able to show is that, a small extension
of the neoclassical model which incorporates costly intermediation of entry costs may be
capable of accounting for the low returns in poor countries. All the other factors can of
course enhance these return di¤erences. There are several papers that are related to our
work. For example, Zebregs (1999) provides a production function based rationale for capital
immobility. In that framework, domestic and foreign capital are imperfect substitutes in
production, and have an elasticity of substitution that varies with a country’s technology
gap with respect to developed countries. Therefore, “both capital-scarce, technologically
less-advanced countries, and capital-rich, technologically advanced countries can have lower
rates of return to foreign investment.”6 Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) construct
a two-country model which features diminishing returns and production risk, both of which
provide incentives for investors in rich countries to invest in poor countries. However, this
is countered by sovereign country risk which tempers the ‡ow, especially during times of
“crises”. They report that twice a century occurrence of international crises is enough
to generate empirically plausible ‡ows between the “North”, which owns 80% of the total
capital stock, and the “South”. Gertler and Rogo¤ (1990) and Boyd and Smith (1997)
show that informational frictions may result in funds ‡owing from poor to rich countries.
Informational frictions, while enhancing our results, are not required for them. Our focus is
6See Robertson (1999) for another technology based model. In his dual economy model, capital is used
only in manufacturing. Low allocation of labor to manufacturing in capital-poor countries can keep the return
low.
5also more quantitative.7
2 Neoclassical Production Function
In this section we present the predictions of the standard neoclassical model, and some of its
extensions, with respect to capital returns across countries. These results provide us with a
benchmark for future comparisons.
In order to present quantitative results on capital returns that are implied by the neo-
classical model, we use per worker capital levels in 1985 from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997) who report data for 88 countries.8 We group the countries into quartiles from lowest
to highest levels of physical capital per worker which allows us to smooth out highly idio-
syncratic country elements. Huge di¤erences in capital per worker, (k); can be seen across
countries in the …rst column of Table 1 where we present the relative level of physical capital
per worker averaged across countries within the group. The per worker physical capital in
the richest group is about 40 times than that of the poorest group.
Table 1 : Capital and income by quartile
Capital quartile k h1¡® k=y
lowest 0.025 0.087 0.472
second 0.090 0.180 0.621
third 0.283 0.338 0.839
highest 1.030 0.619 1.370
Initially, we can compute the static returns to capital for the group of countries displayed
in Table 1 by using a neoclassical production function, and assuming that the technology
parameter and the capital intensity parameter were same across countries. This can be
viewed as an extension of the exercise carried out by Lucas (1990).
Consider the simple neoclassical aggregate production function in its intensive (per unit
labor) form for a given country i: yi = Aik®
i . The return to capital is simply given by the
marginal product of capital as ®Aik®¡1
i : In Table 2 we present the ratios of capital returns
of the poorer country groups to that of the richest country group where we take ® to be
0:35, a fairly standard value.
7There is also a related literature that connects …nancial intermediation and economic growth and de-
velopment in general; see, for instance, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) for a theoretical exposition, and
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) for empirical support. Our focus is on the return to capital and its ‡ow
across countries.
8Out of the full sample we drop 10 countries who seem to have anomalously high TFP levels relative to
the U.S. For example, Syria, Iraq, Trinidad and Tobaga have TFP levels ranging from 20% to 50% higher
than that of the U.S.
6Table 2 : Capital Returns
Capital quartile k di¤erences k & h di¤erences k=y di¤erences
Lowest (k = 0.025) 11.00 1.54 2.90
Second (k = 0.1) 4.47 1.30 2.21
Third (k = 0.275) 2.31 1.26 1.63
Highest (k = 1) 1 1 1
The relative per worker capital levels roughly correspond to the capital di¤erences in
Table 1. According to the results described in the second column of Table 2, if the only
di¤erence between countries was in their capital-labor ratios, the return to capital in the
lowest income countries would be 11 times higher than the return in the highest income
countries. According to these results, all capital would have to ‡ow solely to low income
countries. The lack of ‡ows commensurate with such di¤erentials is what motivated Lucas
(1990) to ask why capital does not ‡ow from rich to poor countries.
Suppose we now write the above production function as yi = Ak®
i h1¡®
i , where hi is the
per worker (or average) human capital in country i, and A is a common technology factor
across all countries. The third column of Table 1 presents data on human capital
¡
h1¡®¢
per-worker across these countries while the third column of Table 2 shows returns to capital
for this case. Including di¤erences in human capital reduces the di¤erence in the returns
between the richest and poorest countries to a factor of 1.54. The ordering of relative returns
is preserved, and all capital should still ‡ow to the poorest countries.
Even if output is written as y = k® (¢¢¢), where we are agnostic about the other pro-
duction inputs, one gets the expression for marginal return of capital as r = ®
k=y: Using
the relative capital-to-output ratios for the four quartiles, as calculated from Klenow and
Rodriguez (1997) and given in the last column of Table 1, we get the return in the poorest
countries to be 2.9 times higher than the return in the highest income countries (last column
of Table 2).9
2.1 Evaluating Alternate Explanations
Can the pattern of capital ‡ows documented above be explained by di¤erences in deprecia-
tion rates, capital intensities, or tax rates across countries– explanations that seem natural
alternatives at …rst glance?
9One could proceed further, by assuming A is di¤erent across countries as well, but given our objective of
using quantities that are directly measurable or estimable, we do not do so. Since A is typically calculated as
a residual, using the levels of income, physical capital, and human capital as inputs, it is not clear that much
can be gained by calculating capital return using such a measure of A.
7What are the di¤erences in depreciation rates between the poorest and richest countries
that would be needed to equate returns across them, and thereby eliminate the incentive for
capital to ‡ow? We set ® = 0:35; a capital-output ratio of 3 for the richest quartile country,
and use the relative k=y given in Table 1 to compute gross returns according to r = ®
k=y:
For the net return of the lowest quartile countries to be equal to that of the highest quartile
countries, their depreciation rate has to be higher by 22 percentage points; the depreciation
rate of the second quartile countries has to be higher by 14 percentage points. Assuming
a 10% depreciation rate for the richest countries, an average rate of 32% for the group of
poorest countries appears too high to justify.
What if capital intensities were di¤erent? Similar to the depreciation analysis, we …nd
that ® for the highest quartile countries has to exceed the one for the second quartile countries
by a factor of 2.2 before their returns are equated. Gollin (2002) presents estimates of
capital share for several countries in our sample, though not for those in the lowest quartile.
However, the above-mentioned factor in his data never exceeds 1 for his entire sample, and
barely exceeds 1, when, as he does, Botswana is dropped.10
Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) argue that the high price of investment relative to con-
sumption in poor countries is driven by high investment prices that prevail there. They
interpret these high prices as barriers to investment in the economy; in their model, house-
holds face a tax rate on each unit of investment. They report investment price ratios for
the poorest to rich countries of about 6.5; in other words, pre-tax return to investment has
to be more than six times in the poorest country before there is an incentive for capital to
‡ow there. However, in a recent paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2002) include non-traded goods
to argue that the high relative price of investment to consumption is driven by lower prices
of consumption in poor countries. They conclude, “Investment prices are no higher in poor
countries than in rich countries.” Here, as in the earlier two explanations, it will be di¢cult
to reconcile returns with capital ‡ows to middle income countries – there is no reason to
expect non-monotonicity in depreciation rates, capital intensities, or investment prices across
countries. Nevertheless, the connection between barriers and capital ‡ows might be worth
pursuing. The costs that we analyze could indeed be interpreted as one barrier to e¤ective
capital allocation.
3 The Model Economy
3.1 Individuals
Each economy has an in…nitely-lived representative consumer. The consumer has a standard
utility function
P1
t=0 ¯tu(ct), where ¯ is the subjective discount factor. The consumer earns
10This is consistent with his main point that capital income shares, once properly accounted for, are not
very di¤erent across countries.
8interest income from intermediated capital and has to decide between consumption and
saving. When we consider two integrated economies, we assume identical preferences for the
consumers in both of them. We assume CRRA preferences, with risk aversion parameter ¾.
In each economy, there is a continuum of one-period lived, risk neutral, entrepreneurs
whose measure is normalized to one. The entrepreneurs are born without any endowment
except for human capital and have to fund the entry costs as well as capital requirements
of their projects by borrowing them from the intermediary. They can undertake either a
safe project (an “old” technology) or a risky project (a “new” technology); the technology is
described in greater detail below. Each entrepreneur is indexed by the potential to succeed
in the risky project, which is denoted by a. This “ability” is meant to proxy di¤erences in
managerial talent, as well as luck or project potential. We will use the terms “entrepreneurial
ability” and “project quality” interchangeably. We normalize a ² [0;1]:11 The distribution of
this ability in the population of entrepreneurs is denoted by F, the density of which is given
by f; and is assumed to be continuous and strictly positive in [0;1]. Entrepreneurs decide on
their projects at the beginning of the period, borrow and invest the proceeds, and consume
their output net of repayment at the end of the period. Notice that in this economy, physical
capital is supplied by consumers and human capital is supplied by entrepreneurs.
3.2 Technology
The entrepreneurs can undertake a project with a tried and tested safe technology (“farm”),





, where e i is the amount of capital employed in the safe technology. The
risky technology produces YH (i¤), when successful, and YL (i¤) when it fails. Here, i¤ is the
amount of capital employed in the risky technology. We assume YL (i¤) < Y (i¤) < YH (i¤),
8 i¤; when the new technology is implemented successfully it yields a higher output than
the existing technology, but it can also fail on account of misadoption, problems inherent to
untried technologies, and plain bad luck. We will present the model for a general YL, but
often specialize to the case of YL = 0: We also assume that the above relationship among
the three types of projects also holds for marginal yields: Y
0




H (i¤), 8 i¤,
and that the three production functions are strictly concave.12
11We further assume that for any given ability there is a measure one of entrepreneurs. This is a purely
technical assumption that allows the law of large numbers to be used in writing the intermediary’s objective
function.
12Obstfeld (1995) cites the work by Lucas (1990) and King and Rebelo (1993) to point out the problem
inherent in using the simple neoclassical aggregate production function to calculate returns – it ignores
multiple production activities with di¤erent capital requirements, a situation that could result in di¤erent
aggregate capital-output ratios but similar factor returns. Our work stays very close in spirit to the standard
neoclassical production function, but by considering a simple disaggregation of production shows one way of
avoiding this pitfall.
9An entrepreneur of ability a has a probability ¼(a) of succeeding, that is, getting the high
output, when the risky project is undertaken. We assume that 0 < ¼(a) < 1, ¼
0
(a) > 0, and
¼(0) = 0. Entrepreneurial ability is irrelevant for the successful execution of a safe project.
3.3 Financial Intermediation
Since there is idiosyncratic risk in this environment, there is a role for intermediation – by
pooling risks, an intermediary can guarantee a certain return to a consumer who wants to
invest in the entrepreneurs’ projects. Consumers, who want to intertemporally smooth their
consumption, “deposit” their assets (capital) kt with the intermediary, who guarantees them
a certain rate of return r, at the beginning of time t.
Entry cost, as graphed in Figure 2, and intermediation cost for the risky (new) projects
are denoted by a single parameter e. We assume that this cost is borne completely by
the entrepreneurs. Given that entrepreneurs are born with no endowment and depend on
borrowed funds to start the project, this seems a reasonable assumption to make. Therefore,
any entrepreneur who undertakes the risky project will actually borrow (e + i¤) from the
intermediary. The safe projects cost nothing to intermediate.13
While the type of project undertaken (“farm” versus “factory”) is costlessly observable
to the …nancial intermediary, we assume that the ability of the entrepreneur who borrows to
invest in a factory is not observable at any cost. The intermediary, therefore, cannot make
a loan for a risky project that depends on ability. Instead, the …nancial contract o¤ered by
the intermediary to anyone who undertakes the risky project is given by the pair (i¤;rr),
where i¤ is the amount lent, and rr is the interest rate charged. For the safe project, the
intermediary o¤ers loans at any amount at the rate rs:
Why cannot the intermediary design an ability-varying contract, where agents truth-
fully announce a, and get a corresponding (i¤;rr), with both of them varying (presumably
increasing) in a? It is easiest to examine this issue when YL = 0, though in section A.4,
we argue that for small enough positive perturbations of YL; one could also rule out such
contracts. In the zero output case, failure of a risky project will always result in default.
13The cost e is best interpreted as the excess cost of intermediating a loan for a risky (new) project as
opposed to a safe (old) one. The zero cost assumption for safe projects is mainly made for simplicity. While
we do not model entry explicitly, we interpret the risky technology as “new” technology that will face higher
costs of implementation in poorer economies.
An alternative interpretation is to view the “safe” sector as agriculture. As is well known, in most developed
and developing countries, the agricultural sector is often protected. Subsidized credit is one of the tools
used for such protection. For example, Gardner (1990, p. 37-38) reports that an emergency loan program
established in the mid-1970s in the US, provided more than $6 billion in subsidized credit to farmers in
counties declared as disaster areas. He notes, “In 1997, a year of record large crops, two-thirds of U.S.
counties quali…ed as disaster areas.”
10The entrepreneur’s ex ante problem is:
max
aC
¼(aT)fYH (i¤(aC)) ¡ rr (aC)i¤ (aC)g;
where aT is the entrepreneur’s true ability, and aC is the ability that the entrepreneur claims
(“announces”). It is obvious that all entrepreneur’s will claim the aC that maximizes pro…ts if
successful, irrespective of what their true ability aT really is. As elaborated in the appendix,
the inability to penalize low ability entrepreneurs in the failed state implies that a scheme
in which allocations varied systematically with a would unravel.14
The sequence of events within a period is as follows. Entrepreneurs sign contracts (bor-
row) that are appropriate for the projects undertaken. The loan market clears – funds
available for investment, kt, equals the total amount of funds demanded by the safe and
risky entrepreneurs (including entry and intermediation costs borne by those who undertake
the risky projects). Risky projects succeed or fail. Claims of failure are inspected by the
intermediary at a cost ¹; which is assumed to be the same for all countries, and any output
and all capital are appropriated by the intermediary. Claims of success are accompanied
by debt repayment according to the interest stipulated by the contract. Entrepreneurs who
undertook the safe projects also repay their debt with interest. Entrepreneurs who under-
took the safe project or succeeded in implementing the risky one consume output net of debt
repayment; failed entrepreneurs consume nothing. All entrepreneurs die at the end of the
period.15
Since intermediation occurs within the period, it can be studied in a static setting; that
is, we can study how any available amount of capital is intermediated without regard to
the determination of the amount itself. The supposition is that the intermediary is a proxy
not just for local consumers but anybody who chooses to invest in the country mutual fund
including the foreign consumers.
14This argument implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs cannot be “bribed”; this, together with limited
liability, implies that payo¤s to entrepreneurs lie between zero and the output actually produced.
15Such a static intermediation structure is also considered by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) and Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998), who use the costly veri…cation approach pioneered by Townsend (1979) to study
the e¤ect of agency costs in amplifying shocks to net worth. While the model here shares certain features
with those models, there are important di¤erences as well. They have only one type of project, a risky one,
the productivity of which is unobservable and realized after the investment is made. Claims of default arising
from inability to pay are veri…ed at a cost. Such a costly veri…cation reveals the output and hence the type
of project (“ability”). In our model, there are two types of projects and the mix of the projects undertaken
depends on initial costs and project potential, and all failed projects look alike. Therefore, ¹, which is better
interpreted as a bankruptcy cost rather than a true veri…cation cost, plays a less important role in our setup.
113.4 A Two-Country Version
Consider an integrated, two country version of this setup – local and foreign (denoted by
the superscripts L and F). The two countries di¤er in their initial physical capital, k0;
human capital, h; and the cost parameter e: Denote the return guaranteed to the depos-
itor by the intermediary of a country by rI(k;h;e); we will characterize this function in
the next section: The implicit assumption is that intermediation is a “non-tradeable” – all
evaluation, screening, and monitoring of projects has to be done locally. How valid is this
assumption given the prevalence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ‡ows? Fernandez-Arias
and Hausmann (2000) note that …nancing through FDI does not completely preclude local
intermediation since foreign companies may “hedge their earnings and protect the value of
their assets, or outright speculate, by borrowing in domestic currency and pledging physical
capital as collateral.”16 Therefore, in studying the e¤ect of intermediation costs on capital
‡ows, it appears we are not missing a …rst order or a systematic e¤ect by assuming that all
intermediation is done locally.









t is the amount deposited by the local consumers in the foreign mutual fund, and
DF
t is the amount deposited by the foreigners in the local mutual fund. Here kL
t is the capital
owned by the local consumers. The condition for the foreign intermediary will be identical
with F replacing L and vice-versa.17












and at the integrated steady state will be equal to ½+±, given consumers’ preferences. If we
envision an " transaction cost of investing in a foreign country, it will be the case that only
one of the Ds will be positive. (Equivalently, we can interpret the Ds as net ‡ows.) Without
loss of generality, assume that DL
t = 0 and DF
t > 0; that is, the local country is the country
with higher return initially.
16On a related note, Feldstein (1994) reports that by the end of 1989, net external …nance from U.S. parent
companies for their a¢liates abroad was $227 Billion, while those from non-US sources, mostly in the form
of debt, was $659 Billion.




















In this section, we outline the dynamic structure of the two-country model, taking as given
the return as a function of capital employed and cost e. It is useful to think of the two country
case in the standard neoclassical set up …rst – in our context, this could be interpreted as
having no risky projects available. We then turn to our model with entry and intermediation
costs.
The analysis of the (static) return function within an economy is presented subsequently.
4.1 Neoclassical Model
The return in this case can be characterized by rI (kt;h), is decreasing in k=h, and is the
same function for all countries. At time zero, we assume kF
0 > kL
0 – either both countries
are o¤ their closed steady states or only the foreign country is in its closed steady state;
implicit in this assumption is that both countries cannot be on their steady states, for there
will be no capital ‡ow as rI = ½ + ± for both where ½ is the rate of time preference and ±
represents the depreciation rate. Given the same rI (¢) for both, it follows that for returns














The share of world capital employed in an economy is dictated by its human capital level.





























: Given the common return, and commonality of the other parameters, it follows

















; that is given the world quantities for consumption, investment, and capital,



















; and the consumption ratios are constant at all times, the asset ownership ratios are





. Therefore the share parameters are





. It is easy to verify that the individual budget constraints
and the constancy of the consumption ratios will be satis…ed with these share parameters.
In other words, given the homotheticity of preferences and linearity of budget constraints,
































2 given and rW
t as given above. This dynamic
system can be solved for the time (transition) paths cW
t ; iW
t , kW
t , and rW
t , as well as the
corresponding steady state quantities: Once the integrated world equilibrium is solved for,
we can compute all quantities for the individual countries. Substitute for the assets owned
in terms of the share parameters we can the get capital ‡ow as DF
t =
¡
hLsF ¡ hFsL¢ kW
t
hW .
4.2 Model with Entry, Intermediation Costs
Here, the rI (¢) functions are di¤erent for both countries. However, it should be possible to
compute an integrated equilibrium as in the neoclassical case, with the rate of return for any
given world capital, kW













For any given e, the return monotonically decreases in k=h, so the there is a unique allocation
of world capital between the two countries that satis…es the above condition.
4.3 Optimal Allocation and Static Returns
We now turn to characterizing rI(kt;e) within a country with the cost parameter e. The
magnitude of di¤erences in such returns across countries will give us an idea of the incentive
for capital to ‡ow across borders when these economies become integrated and serve as a
basis for the dynamic analysis discussed above.







YH (i¤) = AH (i¤)
® h1¡®
YL (i¤) = AL (i¤)
® h1¡®;
with AL < A < AH; where h is the level of human capital.18 The capital intensity in the
production function, 0 < ® < 1, is assumed to be constant across production functions.
18In our experiments there will be no intersectoral di¤erences in human capital within a country. This
speci…cation for human capital has the advantages of simplicity, direct comparability with previous studies
such as Lucas (1990), and allows one to use estimates of average human capital based on schooling measures,
say from Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) or Barro and Lee (1996). However, it does not fully exploit the possi-
bilities of the model. Silva (2002) extends our model by allowing human capital to in‡uence entreprenuerial
ability and …nds that our results are strengthened.
14We also assume that project quality is uniformly distributed in [0;1], and the probability of
success as a function of quality is ¼(a) = a: We have f (a) = 1; and F (a) = a:





for the safe project and (i¤;rr) for the risky project, decides to choose one













; ¼(a)fYH (i¤) ¡ rr(e + i¤)g
¾
:
The problem has been written in the tradition of the costly state veri…cation approach, where
agents claim failure truthfully, the claim is veri…ed by the intermediary, and all output (which
will be less than the stipulated repayment amount) is collected by the intermediary.19
Since the pro…t from the safe project is independent of a, and the pro…t from the risky
project is increasing in a for any given (i¤;rr), it is clear that the decision rule follows a
threshold policy. There exists an a¤ ² (0;1], such that all agents with a < a¤ undertake
the safe project, and those with a > a¤, undertake the risky project. For the person at the
threshold ability, it follows that, the expected pro…t from the two activities should equalize




¡ rse i: (1)
If there is free entry into the intermediation sector, one would expect the o¤ered con-
tracts to exhaust all gains from trade subject to informational constraints. We therefore
solve for the contracts o¤ered by maximizing the total surplus to the intermediary and the
entrepreneurs. In other words, we envision a country mutual fund that intermediates avail-
able capital among projects and guarantees a safe return to investors. The problem is stated
directly in terms of the threshold ability, a¤, and the capital rented for each type of project,
e i and i¤. Once we solve for these optimal quantities, the prices that support these quantities
in a decentralized setup can be backed out from rs = ®Ae i®¡1h1¡®, and rr from equation (1).
We denote by ©(a¤) the measure of successful risky projects, and by £(a¤) the measure of
















It follows that ©
0
(a¤) = ¡a¤ < 0, and £
0
(a¤) = ¡(1 ¡ a¤)f (a¤) < 0. However, more
relevant to our results are the following facts. The fraction of successful projects is increasing
19The problem has also been written assuming the low state will result in default. This is automatic when
AL is zero. When it is not, the default will occur when AH=AL is high enough that the optimal contract
would prefer default in the low state to throttling investment to high ability project. That is, the maximized
value when the constraint AL (i
¤)
® h
1¡® > rr (e + i
¤) is in place is lower than when this constraint is not in
place.
15in a¤. That is,
©(a¤)
1¡F(a¤) = 1+a¤
2 ; is increasing in a¤. Any factor that causes fewer risky
projects to be undertaken in equilibrium (an increase in a¤), for instance an increase in
initial costs, will increase the quality of projects and the rate of successful completion. For
the uninformed intermediary, this quantity can be viewed as the probability that a given
project (whose potential cannot be observed) is successful, conditional on it being risky. It
therefore follows that the fraction of failed projects,
£(a¤)
1¡F(a¤) = 1¡a¤
2 ; is decreasing in a¤.20







+©(a¤)YH (i¤) + £(a¤)fYL (i¤) ¡ ¹g;
subject to the resource constraint:
F (a¤)e i + (1 ¡ F (a¤))(e + i¤) = kt: (2)
The objective function takes into account the cost of verifying the claims of failure of the
risky projects. The resource constraint takes into account the iceberg costs involved in
intermediating the risky projects.
















1 ¡ F (a¤)
Y
0










¼ (a¤)YH (i¤) + (1 ¡ ¼(a¤))fYL (i¤) ¡ ¹g ¡ ¸(e + i¤);
with (4) holding with equality if a¤ < 1:
Condition (3) asserts that the marginal product of risky project, weighted by the proba-
bilities of success and failure averaged over the risky pool, is equal to the marginal product
of the safe project. Condition (4), asserts that the marginal risky project is as pro…table
as the safe project. An increase in the cost parameter e, exerts an upward pressure on the
quality of the marginal project a¤; for high enough costs, it is not pro…table to fund risky
projects even for the most able entrepreneur, and (4) is an inequality.
Return to capital in this framework is calculated using revenues obtained by the inter-
mediary. Since the intermediary is acting on behalf of the investors, this is also the share









e i. This share is increasing in a¤, and e i.
The intermediary’s share from the entrepreneurs who undertake the risky project is:
©(a¤)rr (e + i¤) + £(a¤)fYL (i¤) ¡ ¹g;
20The properties of © and £ are not speci…c to the functional forms chosen.
16where the …rst term is the contracted repayment from the successful entrepreneurs, and the
second term is the output “con…scated” from the failed entrepreneurs net of bankruptcy
costs. Using (1), we get that the intermediary’s total share from the safe and risky projects
as:

















where y is the maximized output. The return to funds can then be obtained by dividing this
share by kt, the total amount of funds available.
4.3.1 Characterizing Returns
In this section, we substantiate the following arguments (algebraic details are relegated to
the appendix):
1. The optimal allocation can be characterized by a system of two equations in the quality
threshold, a¤; and the risky project investment, i¤:
2. The aggregate production function has a form similar to the neoclassical production
function. Without entry and intermediation costs, e; or with very large costs, the
model behaves like the neoclassical model; an increase in the total capital stock causes
the return to decrease.
3. The following e¤ects govern the return to capital in the general case:
(a) For a given amount of total capital, as the cost of funding risky projects, e,
increases, the quality threshold, a¤; increases. The substitution of capital into
safe projects causes a decrease in the marginal return to capital.
(b) While the measure of risky projects, (1 ¡ a¤); decreases with e, the total cost of
risky projects could increase. The resulting scarcity of net funds – an “income”
e¤ect – exerts a downward pressure on safe project funding causing the marginal
return to increase.
(c) The presence of these two opposing e¤ects could make the return non-monotonic
with respect to e: For low-cost, capital-rich countries, the substitution e¤ect is
weaker and the income e¤ect stronger, making it likely that their returns are
higher than those of poor countries.
(d) The presence of private information induces an ine¢ciency in the funding of
projects. The increase in the quality threshold decreases this ine¢ciency; the
returns in rich countries increase disproportionately.





















We can see see here that the risky project investment relative to that of the safe project, i¤
e i ,
increases with the threshold quality, a¤.
We next derive the relevant equations that determine a¤ ande i: Using (6) in (4) and after




















































is a factor that captures the quality of the risky pool and is increasing in a¤. The left
hand side of (7) is the ratio of pro…t from the threshold risky project to that of the safe
project, which has to equal one if any risky project is undertaken at all; if it is less than one
even for the most able entrepreneur (a¤ = 1); say when costs are high, no risky projects are
undertaken.
We now turn to the determination of e i itself for a given amount of available capital, kt:
Using (6) in (2) we can get:






















¡(a¤), a factor that is decreasing in a¤; captures the extensive margin of funding. When
multiplied by e i, it gives the total investment net of …xed costs in both types of projects.
The …rst term within curly braces is the measure of safe projects and the second term,
which drives the overall decrease, is the measure of risky projects adjusted for the increased
investment in these projects relative to the safe project. Equations (7) and (8) can be solved





and rr from (1).
2) Comparisons with the neoclassical function: We next derive expressions for the
total output. Use (6) in the objective function, to write:





When ¹ ! 0; y = ¡(a¤)Ae i®h1¡®: Note the similarity with the neoclassical production
function except for the endogenously determined factor, ¡(a¤).
18When costs are zero, (7) reduces to ¤(a¤) = 1, and the threshold, a¤, is determined
by the technological parameters that are common to all countries. Therefore, ¡(a¤) is also
determined by these common technological parameters alone; denote this by ¡0. Condition
(8) reduces to ¡0e i = kt: Use this e i in (10), with ¹ set to zero, to get y = (¡0)
1¡® Ak®
t h1¡®:
This is essentially the neoclassical production function, with its attendant implications for
returns.
When costs are prohibitively large, the left hand side of (7) becomes less than 1, and
a¤ = 1: From (8) and (9), we can see that ¡(1) = 1, ande i = kt: Total output in (10) reduces
to Ak®
t h1¡®, which is the neoclassical production function.
Therefore, if the aim is to go beyond the neoclassical return implications, we need to
consider di¤erences in intermediation costs across countries that a¤ect the composition of
projects undertaken in them. It is in this sense, the more general case of a¤ < 1 gives rise to
a “disaggregated” production function with interesting implications for returns.



















The return is calculated as imret = imshare=kt: As will be discussed in item d, the second
term within the curly braces captures the e¤ect of private information, and the last term
captures veri…cation / bankruptcy costs. To study the e¤ect of safe project investment, e i;
on returns – the focus of items a through c below – we ignore these two terms and write
the remaining portion of the return as: ¡(a¤)Ae i®h1¡®=kt. Using (8), we can write this as h
1 ¡ (1 ¡ a¤) e
kt
i
Ae i®¡1h1¡®: In other words, an increase in e i has a tendency to decrease the
return.
a) The substitution e¤ect of an increase in e: Condition (7) indicates that an increase
in the cost of funding each risky project would increase the threshold quality at which the
risky project becomes pro…table relative to the safe one. Indeed, as formally shown in section
A.1, @a¤
@e > 0: We can write (8) as:
e i =
kt ¡(1 ¡ a¤)e
¡(a¤)
: (12)
The increase in a¤ causes the extensive factor ¡(a¤) to decrease, thereby increasinge i: As the
safe project is funded more intensively, the return tends to drop.
b) The “income” e¤ect of an increase in e: From (12), we can see that when a¤
increases, if (1 ¡ a¤(e))e decreases, the substitution e¤ect is reinforced. However, if the
elasticity of a¤ with respect to e is small, (1 ¡ a¤ (e))e could increase, causing e i to drop;
the return then increases. The increased intensity of funding risky projects relative to safe
projects when a¤ increases is evident from (6).
19c) Non-monotonicities in return: These opposing e¤ects can make returns to capital
non-monotonic in costs even for a given level of capital. As shown in section A.1, the









¡ (1 ¡ a¤): (13)
In the range where e is low, a¤ is low; the negative term dominates, and e i tends to decrease
with e: When e is high, a¤ is high; the positive term dominates, and e i tends to increase
with e: The safe project investment e i is in general U-shaped in e; and the marginal return
to capital is inverse U-shaped:
More importantly, the pro…les of returns with respect to e themselves vary with the
amount of capital available, in a way that could cause the return of a low-cost, capital-rich






=@k < 0: The substitution e¤ect that decreases return is weaker for capital-
rich countries; this is to be expected, given the lower fraction of costs in total funding.
Moreover, it can be shown that a capital rich country will have a greater fraction of risky
projects; i.e. @a¤=@k < 0. As seen in the discussion of (13), the low a¤ would accentuate the
increasing portion of the return curve. Alternately, in terms of the discussion in (3b), it is
for such countries that the elasticity of a¤ with respect to e is likely to be the lower, and the
income e¤ect more dominant. A prominent increasing portion in the return curve for rich
countries, and decreasing portion for poor countries result.
d) The private-information e¤ect: In section A.3, we show that the constraint on ob-
servability of project quality causes a given marginal project to be overfunded, and the
highest quality project to be under-funded. The factor (1+(a¤)2)
2a¤ in the second term within
curly braces in (11), captures this ine¢ciency in funding. When a¤ increases, say due to
increased costs, this ine¢ciency decreases, increasing the intermediary’s share and thus the
return; that is, the wedge between the risky and safe interest rates decreases with decreasing
heterogeneity in project quality. The presence of the constraint disproportionately increases
the returns of rich countries, which have lower a¤s to begin with.21
Now that we have qualitatively demonstrated that di¤erences in intermediation costs
can give rise to non-monotonic returns, we turn to parametrizing this environment and
investigating its properties quantitatively.
5 Quantitative Results
As a starting point for our quantitative results we consider countries that di¤er with respect
to their physical and human capital levels. In order to reduce the number of parameters to
21There is also a direct e¤ect of an increase in a
¤ on returns – lower observation costs with fewer failed
projects.
20seek, we assume AL = 0: For the share of capital we use ® = 0:35: We set ¹ = 0:05 and verify
later whether the results are sensitive to our choice and if the resulting bankruptcy costs look
reasonable. The calibration of the remaining technology parameters, A; AH; are such that the
k=y ratio and the net return for the richest (k = 1) group of countries when intermediation is
costless (e = 0) are around 3 and 7% respectively. Depreciation rate is taken to be 9%. The
values used are, A = 0:2462; AH = 0:5459, with AH=A being 2:2. This ratio, AH=A; is very
important for determining the di¤erences in returns to capital in our setup and is further
discussed in Section 6.1. It is worth emphasizing that these technology parameters are held
constant across countries in the quantitative exercises that follow; only the cost parameter
and the level of capital per e¤ective labor, which are empirically observable quantities, are
varied.22
Our strategy is to experiment with a large number of possible values for e, maintaining
the assumption that poorer countries are faced with a higher e. In order to examine whether
the size of these costs that are generated by our model are reasonable, we later compare
them with the overhead costs that were displayed in Figure 3.
5.1 Static Returns
The returns for this case are obtained by solving (7) and (8), and calculating imshare=k
using (11) for various levels of costs and by using the distribution of physical and human
capital, as estimated by Klenow and Rodriguez (1997), in the 1980s as a starting point.
Table 3 displays the returns where the return in the highest income country with zero
intermediation costs is normalized to be 1. For the case where intermediation costs are set
to zero for all the countries, the return ratio for the lowest income country is 1.24 relative
to the highest income country. However, once we allow for positive costs the results change
signi…cantly. We may examine this table in several di¤erent ways. For example, if we
consider the same intermediation cost for all the economies, we observe that physical and
human capital di¤erences are such that the middle income countries dominate in returns
over the lowest income country, for any positive intermediation cost considered. In addition,
if we assume di¤erences in e across countries, we obtain cases where the rate of return in all
the countries, even in the richest, dominate the rate of return in the lowest income country.
This result is very di¤erent than the one in the pure neoclassical model described in the
third column of Table 2, where the lowest income country dominates in rates of return.
22Equation (7) pins down a
¤ as a function of
AH
A in the costless case. Equations (8), (10) and (11) can then
be used to solve for AH and A separately to get the above-mentioned capital-output ratio and gross return.
21     Table 3: Relative Returns
         
Cost K=0.025 K=0.1 K=0.275 K=1
0.000 1.24 1.24 1.26 1.00
0.016 1.18 1.22 1.26 1.00
0.032 1.11 1.20 1.25 1.00
0.048 1.04 1.17 1.25 1.00
0.064 0.97 1.15 1.24 1.00
0.080 0.91 1.12 1.24 1.00
0.096 0.86 1.10 1.23 1.00
0.112 0.82 1.07 1.22 1.00
0.128 0.82 1.05 1.21 1.00
0.144 0.82 1.02 1.20 1.00
0.160 0.82 0.99 1.19 1.00
0.176 0.82 0.97 1.18 0.99
The results in this table, which are depicted Figure 4, seem consistent with the stylized
facts about capital ‡ows mentioned in the introduction. Once these closed economies open
up, there will be a greater tendency for capital to ‡ow from the richest to middle income
countries rather than to the poorest. This dominance is stronger when we factor in the
higher intermediation costs poorer countries are likely to face. As discussed in Section 4.3.1,
the substitution e¤ect of an increase in e; which decreases the return to capital, is stronger
for the capital-poor countries; one can see a more prominent decreasing portion for them.
One can also see that for all e > 0:11; the poorest country’s return ‡attens out, as only safe
projects are undertaken; that is, a¤ = 1:














Figure 4: Returns to Capital
Another way to represent the implications of our model versus the neoclassical model on
returns is given in Figure 5 which plots rI versus k for the country groupings we consider
22assuming the cost parameters highlighted in Table 3. The relative capital stocks for 1985,
shown in Table 2, are marked. Notice that while the neoclassical model would have yielded
only one return function for the economy, in our model there is one return function per
entry-intermediation cost combination. According to this picture, “middle income” countries
– those in the third quartile – would receive all capital when the economies are integrated.23





























Figure 5: Capital Return vs Capital Employed
These results also allow us to highlight the implications of some of the modeling assump-
tions we have made. For example, we can isolate the importance of asymmetric information
by examining the returns when costs are zero. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the presence
of private information preferentially increases the return of rich countries by reducing the
heterogeneity of risky project quality. As seen in Table 3, there is no clear dominance of
returns by the poorest economy that one sees in the neoclassical model. Indeed, we have
solved a version of this model in which ability is fully observed and capital can be allocated
based on ability. In that case, with e = 0, the quantitative results are identical to those of
the neoclassical model provided in Table 2, with the relative return in the poorest country
equal to 1.54.
We get an extra quantitative kick by modeling the entry-intermediation costs. Notice
that middle income countries dominate in returns for a very large range of intermediation
costs once e is allowed to be di¤erent than zero, or di¤erent across countries. While the
two aspects of the model can each generate qualitatively similar observations on returns, the
quantitative results are much stronger when they are both present.
23Throughout the paper, we have considered capital ‡ows for e¢ciency reasons rather than consumption
insurance. (See Obstfeld, 1995, for an exposition on international capital ‡ows.) This seemed more relevant,
given our concern with ‡ow of capital from rich to poorer countries rather than among rich countries. The
implication that the middle income countries will receive all capital is likely to become less stark when this
additional motive for capital ‡ow is modeled.
23Can the mere existence of these costs, without any e¤ect on the mix of projects be
su¢cient to eliminate return di¤erences across countries? One way of accommodating such
costs in the standard neoclassical model is as follows: Let e1 and e2 represent a …xed cost and
a variable cost associated with intermediation. If x denotes productive capital and k the total
capital, one can write: e1+(1+e2)x = k and the production function as Y = Ax®h1¡®. We
can then …nd the magnitude of e1 and e2 that are necessary to equate the returns between
the poorest and the richest countries.24 Considering variable costs, e2 alone, the poorest
country’s cost has to be 240% of quantity intermediated for the returns to be equated. If
we consider …xed costs alone, the cost to quantity for the richest country has to be 50%.
None of the costs we have displayed in Figures 2 and 3 are of such magnitude.25 This
exercise con…rms that small costs could have a big e¤ect on returns to capital by altering
the composition of projects undertaken.
In Table 4, we present additional properties of the economies considered above. In par-
ticular we are interested in comparing the intermediation costs obtained in these economies
with the data. We present two measures of intermediation costs and bankruptcy costs as a
per cent of output.
The …rst panel of Table 4 displays intermediation costs divided by the total quantity
intermediated in this economy. The counterpart of this information in the data is what
we have displayed in Figure 3.26 Our results indicate that intermediation costs per unit
intermediated in poor countries can be signi…cantly higher than that of rich countries. For
example, a uniform intermediation cost of 0.016 yields an overhead cost of 8.65% of total
loans for the poorest country and 0.75% for the richest, resulting in about a factor of 11.
The cost di¤erences in the data that were displayed in Figure 3 ranged between almost zero
to 12% of total loans intermediated. If we examine the case where poorer countries have
higher intermediation costs, we can obtain larger di¤erences. For example, if the poorest
country has a cost level of 0.032 then the overhead costs as a percent of total loans jumps
up to 12.94 yielding the costs in the poorest country group to be 17 times that of the richest
country group. In addition, notice that these costs display non-monotonicity for a given level
of capital stock. We observe that very high levels of intermediation costs for poor countries
can generate a low equilibrium level of overhead costs per quantity. For example, overhead











with values used in Table 2.
25One can convert the individual components of entry costs into dollars and …nd their annuitized values.
Doing so reveals magnitudes much smaller.
26In the model economy we had assumed that intermediation cost are only incurred if risky projects are
undertaken. To the extent that there are some intermediation costs associated with safe projects as well in
the data, our results would be underestimating the total intermediation costs in lower income countries. That
assumption also gives rise to zero intermediation costs at high levels of intermediation costs, since the only
projects that are undertaken are the safe ones.
24costs as a percent of total loans goes down from 12.17 to 8.99 as intermediation costs increase
from 0.064 to 0.08 for the poorest country. This non-monotonicity is due to the fact that
very few risky projects will be undertaken in economies with very high intermediation costs,
perhaps accounting for the experiences of some of the low income countries we had presented
in Figure 3.
    Table 4: Additional Properties
  Overhead Costs as a % of Total Loans
Cost K=0.025 K=0.1 K=0.275 K=1
0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.016 8.65 4.70 2.34 0.75
0.032 12.94 8.75 4.56 1.50
0.048 13.76 12.14 6.66 2.23
0.064 12.17 14.89 8.63 2.95
0.080 8.99 17.03 10.47 3.66
0.096 4.78 18.62 12.19 4.36
     Interest Rate Spread
Cost K=0.025 K=0.1 K=0.275 K=1
0.000 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.09
0.016 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.09
0.032 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.09
0.048 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.09
0.064 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.09
0.080 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.09
0.096 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.08
      Bankruptcy Costs/Output
Cost K=0.025 K=0.1 K=0.275 K=1
0.000 6.85 6.25 3.84 1.71
0.016 4.43 5.58 3.69 1.70
0.032 2.56 4.93 3.53 1.68
0.048 1.31 4.29 3.38 1.66
0.064 0.59 3.69 3.22 1.64
0.080 0.21 3.13 3.06 1.62
0.096 0.04 2.64 2.90 1.60
In the second panel of Table 4 we present the spread between the risky rate and the
deposit rate that the intermediary provides for the depositors. Again for a given level of
costs such as 0.016, we can see that poorest countries have higher spreads. As costs increase,
the fraction of risky projects decrease faster for the capital-poor countries. This makes the
risky project pool more homogeneous, resulting in a decrease in the risky rate. Eventually
when all the projects undertaken are the safe ones, there is no di¤erence between the two
rates causing in the spread to go down to zero.
The last panel of this table documents bankruptcy costs as a percent of total output. It
is interesting to note that bankruptcy costs may indeed be much lower in poorer countries
since fewer risky projects are undertaken in those countries compared to rich countries. In
fact, we …nd that both the fraction of total projects that fail and the fraction of risky projects
25that fail are higher in richer countries.27 This implication of the model, seems consistent
with the evidence presented by Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2002) on the higher
incidence of bankruptcies in Chile in the 1980s and the 1990s relative to the slower-growing
Mexico which had a less e¢cient …nancial system.
5.2 Dynamic Results
While a full analysis of integration should include all four types of countries, we can make
the main point about the functioning of our model by examining what happens when a
previously closed poor country opens up and becomes integrated with a richer country that
has a higher return.28 We consider countries in the second (e = :048) and third (e = :032)
quartiles for this integration experiment .29 Our results, shown in Figure 5, indicate that the
countries that had a higher capital stocks in 1985 had higher returns to capital than those
with lower stocks. In this case, contrary to the neoclassical model, the poorer country will
experience capital out‡ow. For this experiment, it is interesting to compare the transition of
the integrated poor country to that of the poor closed country. We do not show the capital
out‡ow from the poor to rich country, but the panels in Figure 6 compare the income and
consumption paths for the poor country during the two transitions.30
The …rst panel shows that the capital employed in the poor country when it is open
is lower than the capital employed, and owned, by it when it is closed, except in the long
run; this is the result of capital out‡ow that occurs in the integrated economy. However,
capital owned by the poor country is higher even in the steady state for the open economy.
The closed economy is forced to invest all its saving locally, while the open economy gets
to invest it in the foreign country and earn higher returns. Therefore, in spite of the lower
share of the world capital and income that the open country has to be satis…ed with, it
can accumulate more capital over time. This is also evident in the second and third panels,
where consumption and income are higher in the open economy during the transition as well
as at the steady state (by 5%). The last panel shows the return to the poor country being
higher throughout the open transition and approaching the closed economy’s return only
asymptotically. The consumption supplement that would be required to make an individual
in the closed economy as well o¤ as the individual in the open economy turns out to be
27For example, the fraction of projects that fail are 0.91, 4.31, 8.08, and 11.06, form the poorest to the
richest countries, for the intermediation cost level of 0.016, and 0.51, 3.73, 7.67, 10.90 for the intermediation
cost level of 0.032.
28Notice that the integrated equilibrium in this framework involves capital ‡ows from richest to middle
income countries as opposed to the poorest as in the neoclassical model.
29We use ½ = 0:07, ± = 0:09;and ¾ = 2 for this experiment.
30We have also conducted this experiment by assuming the same intermediation costs (e = :032) for both
countries and found very similar results.
26signi…cant: 4.23% of consumption in each period. In addition, poor and rich economies in
this framework do not converge to the same steady state, mainly due to the persistence
of the initial di¤erences in human capital. These results are not unexpected. However, in
the standard neoclassical model one cannot even begin to address the issue of poor countries
choosing to remain closed for fear of capital out‡ow, even in the face of overwhelming evidence





























































































Figure 6: Comparison of Open and Closed Transitions
6 Discussion and Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Plausibility of our Technology Parameters
In this section we investigate the sensitivity of our results to certain assumptions we have
made and certain parameter choices we have implemented. For example, it is clear from the
expressions in Section 4.3.1 that the ratio AH
A (and the ratio AL
A when AL is non-zero) plays
an important role in the allocation of funds and hence the return. One way of characterizing
the e¢cacy of the model in reducing return di¤erentials and thus explaining the pattern of
capital ‡ows, is to ask what AH
A needs to be in order to equalize the rate of return for the
richest country group with that of the poorer country group, and ask whether this value
is reasonable. The returns can be obtained from the expressions in the earlier subsection
31See, for example, Kumar (forthcoming), and the references therein.
27suitably adapted for zero costs. For the k = 0:025 country to have the same return as the
k = 1 country, AH
A needs to be 1:91 and for the k = 0:1 country to have the same return as
the k = 1 country, AH
A needs to be 1:65.
A conservative way to assess the empirical plausibility of this technological ratio is to
compare it to the ratio of TFPs for a given industry in a given country as summarized by
Baily and Solow (2001). They report TFP measures for the manufacturing as well as service
industries for several industrialized countries. These ratios fall in the range of 2 to 4. Even
though these ratios represent TFP di¤erences within a given industry in a given country,
we take these as a conservative measure of possible TFP di¤erences across the two types of
projects available in our setup. To be consistent with these ratios for the richest country
group when intermediation costs are negligible, AH
A can be between 2:11 and 2:76 for the
model economy. These …gures con…rm the plausibility of the technology ratios needed to
cause the capital return in richest country group to dominate that of the poorest country
group.32
6.2 Non-zero AL
In our numerical results for the economies we examined AL was assumed to be zero. Below
we show the results on returns to capital where the values used are A = 0:196; AH = 0:524;
and AL = 0:119 and are consistent with a k=y ratio of 3: The qualitative properties of the
…ndings remain unchanged when compared with the earlier results, where AL was assumed
to be zero.
The non-monotonicity of returns in intermediation costs still play an important role
causing countries with lower capital-labor ratios to have lower returns than countries with
higher capital-labor ratios. What changes is the threshold level of intermediation costs after
which capital ‡ows to middle income countries. In the above case the two middle income
countries, with K = 0:275 and K = 0:10, dominate the returns in the poorest and the richest
countries starting from zero intermediation costs.
6.3 The Role of Bankruptcy Costs
We have computed the rates of return for the model economy, with and without bankruptcy
costs to display the impact of bankruptcy costs in this environment. Our results indicate that
poorest countries get dominated in rates of return much more frequently when bankruptcy
costs are assumed to be non-zero as opposed to zero. Similar to the results above, the
threshold level of intermediation costs after which the middle income countries dominate
increases in this case as well. Nevertheless, we …nd that for intermediation costs above
32Comparing the return in the richest and poorest countries is a conservative exercise. Lower
AH
A ratios
are needed to cause the return in a middle income country to dominate that of a poor country.
280:048; our model is able to generate returns that are consistent with the stylized fact that
capital ‡ows more to the middle income countries than to the poor countries even with zero
bankruptcy costs.
6.4 Other Human Capital Measures
The available measures on human capital while all highly correlated di¤er widely in levels.
In the results reported so far, we have used the Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) measure
which is the most inclusive one. In this subsection we discuss the implications of using
other measures, in particular the ones in Hall and Jones (1999) and the “raw” educational
attainment measures in Barro and Lee (1996). This data is reported in Table 5.
Table 5 : Comparison of relative h1¡®
Capital quartile Klenow-Rodriguez Barro-Lee Hall-Jones
lowest 0.14 0.33 0.66
second 0.29 0.56 0.74
third 0.55 0.78 0.84
highest 1.00 1.00 1.00
The Hall and Jones measure seems to be most generous in assessing the human capital
level of poor countries. While Klenow and Rodriguez would assess the poorest countries to
have 14% of the human capital of the richest, Hall and Jones would assess the poorest to
have more than a half of the human capital of the richest. The raw Barro and Lee measure
falls in between.33
By choosing the technology parameters A; AH; and AL appropriately one could construct
return patterns in which the richer countries dominate, at least for some values of the cost.
The main e¤ect of using the di¤erent measures of human capital is to alter the distance
between the return curves shown in Figure 4. The shapes of these curves are preserved.
Instead of pursuing this option in great detail, we conduct an analysis very similar to the
one in the earlier subsection by asking what the ratio AH
A needs to be in order to equalize
the rate of return for the richest country group with that of a poorer country group. Table
6 shows what this ratio needs to be to have the return of the second quartile group (with
high enough costs) same as that of the highest quartile group (with zero cost), taking into
account human capital di¤erences as estimated by the above-mentioned sources.
33The physical capital levels are much closer across the datasets. The Hall and Jones (1999) measure
assumes very strong diminishing returns to education beyond 8th grade which might account for a di¤erence
between the richest and poorest countries that is much smaller than is found in other data sources. In
addition, Klenow-Rodriguez measure includes education as well as on-the-job learning in their measure of
human capital.
29Table 6 : AH
A needed to equate k = 1 and k = 0:1 di¤erences
Klenow-Rodriguez Barro-Lee Hall-Jones
Model Economy 1.65 2.76 3.37
These ratios appear reasonable when compared to the “admissible” ratios given in the
earlier subsection.
7 Conclusions
We …nd that a very simple model, which is close to the neoclassical production model in spirit
but uses variation in entry and intermediation costs to study the mix of projects undertaken,
is capable of accounting for the pattern of capital ‡ows among countries. The fact that only
two new technological parameters (AH, AL) need to be introduced and calibrated to get a
rich variation in returns is a testimonial to this simplicity. We can also get reduced-form
expressions for production in our model which closely resemble the aggregate neoclassical
production function.
Our study can be improved upon, by collecting more direct data on costs of intermediation
and taxes on the intermediation sector and matching model outcomes with them. On the
theoretical side, a future step is to use ideas from the dynamic contract literature in this
quanti…cation exercise. Allen and Gale (2000) note that except for Japan, retentions are
the most important source of …nance (but loans are also important). For this reason, the
dynamics of …rm behavior is likely to be important for aggregate returns. It would also be
interesting to conduct the dynamic analysis with three country groups, rich, middle income,
and poor. One could see the e¤ect of capital ‡ows from both the rich and the poor countries
to the middle income countries, at least until the neoclassical e¤ect dominates and the poor
country also becomes competitive in returns.
We saw that it was bene…cial for a poor country to become economically more open even if
it experienced a capital out‡ow. An interesting question to ask in this regard is whether this
result holds even if there are productivity improvements arising from local production due to
learning by doing. One way of asking this question is, “How strong should learning by doing
be before welfare in the closed and open economies are the same?” Finally, it would be very
useful to model the development of the intermediation sector; to hold intermediation costs
…xed over long periods of time is not satisfactory. This would also allow us to substantively
address the issue of reforms in the …nancial intermediation sector. These are subjects of
ongoing research.
30A Appendix
A.1 Threshold quality increases with costs: @a¤
@e > 0
Di¤erentiate (9) with respect to a¤, simplify, and use (7) to get, ¡0 (a¤) = ¡ ®
1¡®
e
e i < 0, where
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A simple examination of the de…nition of ¤(a¤) under the equation (7) reveals ¤0 (a¤) > 0,
given AH > AL: Therefore it follows @a¤
@e > 0: ¤





















: It is clear that we have to show that
the denominator (denoted Dr) is increasing in e to prove the result. Therefore, di¤erentiate
the denominator w.r.t. e; use the fact ¡0 (a¤) = ¡ ®
1¡®
e
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We have seen @a¤
@e > 0: Therefore the sign of the derivative depends on the terms within
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Using these, straightforward algebra shows that the terms within curly braces in @Dr
@e is
positive if ® < 1
2; in particular, it is true for the ® = 0:35 value we use for our numerical
exercise. Therefore, it follows that @Dr
@e > 0 and @2e i
@e@k < 0: ¤
31A.3 Ine¢ciency of funding caused by private information
The e¤ect of private information can be seen by comparing the constrained outcome with the
full-information outcome, where the intermediary is allowed to write contracts as a function
of ability. Proceeding as we did in the main text, one can show that the equations that

















































When (14) is evaluated at a given a¤ and compared with (6) it is easy to see the full-
information ratio is lower, since a¤AH




















A for any information constrained economy with a¤ between zero
and one. In other words, a given marginal project is relatively overfunded in the information
constrained case, and the highest ability project is under-funded. This ine¢ciency is likely
to decrease whenever a¤ increases, say due to an increase in intermediation costs; that is,
whenever there is not too much heterogeneity in the quality of risky projects undertaken.
The ratio of funding of the highest ability risky project to the lowest ability risky project in










, which decreases with a¤ and approaches
one when a¤ ! 1. This ratio is always one in the information constrained case. Therefore
the deviation from the full information allocation decreases as the information constrained
a¤ decreases and vanishes as a¤ ! 1. ¤
A.4 A su¢cient condition for ability-invariant contracts when AL 6= 0
In the interest of brevity, and given that nothing crucial hinges on AL being > 0; we present
only a sketch of the argument here. Write the maximization problem for allocation of funds















i(a)da = b I
(IR) : a[AHi(a)
® ¡ rH (a)i(a)] + (1 ¡ a)[ALi(a)
® ¡ rL (a)i(a)] >
¼s
³
= (1 ¡ ®)Ae i
® > 0
´
; 8 a ² [a
¤;1]
(IC) : a[AHi(a)
® ¡ rH (a)i(a)] + (1 ¡ a)[ALi(a)





































C 6= a ² [a
¤;1];
where we have imposed ¼(a) = a; F (a) = a, and neoclassical production functions with AH
and AL corresponding to “success” and “failure” states. The …nancial contract (i(a); rH (a); rL (a))
stipulates an investment and a repayment rate for the two possible outcomes. (BC) is the
budget constraint, where funds available for the risky projects net of …xed costs is denoted
by b I. (IR) is the individual rationality constraint, which states each risky entrepreneur gets
at least the safe project pro…t, ¼s, in an expected sense; ife i is the investment level, and since
safe project funding is devoid of informational problems, this pro…t is (1 ¡ ®)Ae i®: The Inada
condition guarantees positive safe project pro…ts, and thus a positive reservation pro…t level.
(IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that every entrepreneur whose












got by claiming ability aC: Implicit are the constraints,
rH (a); rL (a) > 0, which rule out “bribing” the entrepreneurs.
One could analyze this problem and completely characterize the type of contract, but for
arguing that there are parameter con…gurations for which allocations are ability-invariant,
this is unnecessary. Instead we examine the (IR) and (IC) constraints to seek a su¢cient
condition under which ability-varying contracts will not arise. Denote the net earnings of
an ability-a entrepreneur in the two states as wH (a) ´ AHi(a)
® ¡rH (a)i(a) and wL (a) ´
ALi(a)
® ¡ rL (a)i(a);and write the (IC) constraint as:
©














The left hand side is the loss to an entrepreneur at the bad state of overstating his ability
and the term within curly braces on the right hand side is his gain in the good state. The
probability weighted loss from lying has to outweigh the probability weighted gain from lying
to satisfy incentive compatibility. Less able entrepreneurs are likely to be most responsive
to a penalty in their highly probable low state.
An ability-varying incentive compatible contract cannot have wH (a) = constant, 8 a ²
[a¤;1]. If this were so, everyone would claim to have ability aC²argmax(wL (a)). The only
surviving contract then stipulates wL (a) = constant, 8 a ² [a¤;1], and thus the contract
cannot be ability-varying to begin with. Indeed, if wH is the same for any two ability levels,
their wLs will also have to be same.
33For a2 > a1 we can show we cannot have wH (a2) < wH (a1). Suppose not. The (IC) for
the a1 entrepreneur relative to a2 is: a1[wH (a1) ¡ wH (a2)] > (1 ¡ a1)[wL (a2) ¡ wL (a1)]:
Given the supposition, the left hand side is positive. Since a2 > a1; the above inequality then
implies a2wH (a1)+(1 ¡a2)wL (a1) > a2wH (a2)+(1 ¡ a2)wL (a2): In other words, the (IC)
for the a2 entrepreneur relative to a1 is violated. These arguments show that wH (a) needs to
be increasing in an ability varying contract. Moreover, wH (1) > wH (a¤) in such a contract;
if wH (1) = wH (a¤); all the intermediate ability levels need to have the same wH as well,
and we are back in the realm of ability-invariant contracts. The candidate ability-varying
contracts feature strictly increasing wH or a step function (with the wLs being equated across
ability levels within each step).
Consider the lowest ability entrepreneur in the pool, a¤: A su¢cient condition for this
entrepreneur to claim an ability of 1 under an ability-varying contract can be found by letting
the left hand side of (15) take its maximum possible value: The maximum the left hand side
can be (without bribes) is ALi(a¤)
®, that is give the low ability entrepreneur his entire
output. Given wH (1) > wH (a¤); as argued above, we can write the fwH (1) ¡ wH (a¤)g
on the right hand side, without loss of generality, as "Ae i®, for some " > 0: Therefore, a
su¢cient condition is
ALi(a¤)®
"Ae i® < a¤
1¡a¤: Note that this condition is automatically satis…ed
when AL = 0. In that case, there is no way to penalize the low ability person because he
has nothing to lose when he gets the low state. Therefore, as argued in the main text, no
ability-varying scheme is possible. To get a bound on AL in the case where it is not zero,
use the upper bound on
i(a)





1¡® ; and the minimum possible a¤ (also from full information case) as A¡AL
AH¡AL, and










If a non-discriminatory contract is not possible between a¤ and 1; as argued above it is not
possible for intermediate ability levels as well. The above condition is very stringent; but for
our purposes of arguing that for small enough positive perturbations of AL we can still have
ability-invariant contracts o¤ered by the intermediary, this argument su¢ces. ¤
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